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CORPORATIONS: SUSPENSION OF COURT PRIVILEGES
UPON FAILURE TO PAY TAXES
Florida Statutes §610.11 (1949)

All states have statutes requiring domestic corporations to file
annual reports and pay annual franchise, license, or charter fees." In
addition, most of these acts provide for one or more of the following
penalties: suspension of the right to maintain an action in the courts
3
of the particular state;2 a similar suspension of the right to defend;
suspension of the corporate and charter privileges; 4 and forfeiture or
dissolution of the charter itself.5 The judicially declared purpose of
these provisions is merely to enforce the payment of the taxes levied.0
A feature common to these statutes is revival of suspended privileges
7
upon later payment of the delinquent taxes plus any penalty.
Some of the statutes speak of "forfeiture" and "dissolution";" others
purport merely to "suspend" certain or all of the corporate privileges. 9
But even when they go so far as to declare forfeiture or dissolution,
the majority of the courts construe them to mean suspension. 10 These
1
Those interested in the specific statutes will find them tabulated in Note, 48
YuAE
L.J. 650 (1939).
2
Boston Towboat Co. v. John H. Seson Co., 199 Fed. 445 (D. Wash. 1912);
Motor City Engineering Co. v. Fred. E. Holmes Co., 241 Mich. 446, 217 N.W. 25
(1928); West Side Telephone Co. v. Kenison, 147 Wash. 542, 266 Pac. 706 (1928).
3
E.g., FLA. STAT. §610.11 (1949); Ocean Park Bath House & Amusement Co.
v. Pacific Auto Park Co., 37 Cal. App.2d 158, 98 P.2d 1068 (1940); Ross Amigm
Oil Co. v. State, 134 Tex. 626, 138 S.W.2d 798 (1940).
4
E.g., Sunset Oil Co. v. Marshall Oil Co., 16 Cal.2d 651, 107 P.2d 393 (1940);
Dolese Bros. Co. v. Pacific Engineering Co., 95 Okla. 72, 218 Pac. 798 (1923).
SE.g., Nebraska Cent. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Yellowstone, Inc., 140 Neb. 422,
299 N.W. 474 (1941).
6E.g., Sale v. Railroad Comm'n, 15 Cal.2d 612, 104 P.2d 38 (1940); Wax v.
Riverview Cemetery Co., 2 Terry 424, 24 A.2d 431 (Del Super. 1942); Christie v.
Highland Waterfront Co., 114 Fla. 263, 153 So. 784 (1934); Shreveport Long Leaf
Lumber Co. v. Jones, 188 La. 519, 177 So. 593 (1937); Ross Amigos Oil Co. v.
State, 134 Tex. 626, 138 S.W.2d 798 (1940).
7See note I supra.
8
See note 5 supra.
9
See note 4 supra.
1OE.g., Smith v. Highland Mary Mining, Milling & Power Co., 82 Colo. 288, 259
Pac. 1025 (1927); Wax v. Riverview Cemetery Co., 2 Terry 424, 24 A.2d 431
(Del. Super. 1942); Gray v. Central Fla. Lumber Co., 104 Fla. 446, 140 So. 320

(1932).
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results may be supported on two grounds: (1) the general judicial
antipathy to forfeiture of any sort;1 1 and (2) the provisions in most
jurisdictions for reinstatement of lost privileges when back taxes have
been paid.1 2 A majority of the decisions indicate strongly an inclination of the judiciary to construe statutes of this nature in favor of the
delinquent corporations.13
In 1931 the Florida Legislature passed the statute under which all
of the pertinent Florida cases to date have been decided. 4 It provided that any corporation delinquent for six months in filing the
required reports or paying the required fees forfeits its charter and
corporate privileges. In Gray v. Central Florida Lumber Co.,15 the
Supreme Court of Florida, in the first case construing the statute, held
that it did not declare a forfeiture but merely suspended charter
privileges until payment of tax. It was sustained against attack on the
grounds of defective title, discriminatory classification for tax purposes, and contravention of the Florida Constitution 6 in denying
delinquent corporations access to Florida courts. In disposing of this
latter contention, the Supreme Court stated: 17
"A franchise to transact business in this state by either a
domestic or foreign corporation is a privilege which may be
granted or withheld as the state deems proper. This premise
established, it necessarily follows that such a franchise may be
granted on such terms as the sovereignty may prescribe so long
as not in conflict with the Constitution."
"1E.g., State v. Sunset Ditch Co., 48 N.M. 17, 145 P.2d 219 (1944); see 3

Coox, Conpo nONS §637 (8th ed. 1923); 16 FLrzrcua, CoRpoPA-noNs §8035
(Penn.
ed. 1933).
'2 E.g., Watts v. Liberty Royalties Corp., 106 F.2d 941 (10th Cir. 1939); Smith
v, Highland Mary Mining, Milling & Power Co., 82 Colo. 288, 259 Pac. 1025

(1927); Wax v. Riverview Cemetery Co., 2 Terry 424, 24 A.2d 431 (Del. Super.
1942); Eagle Oil Co. v. Cohassett Oil Corp., 263 Mich. 371, 248 N.W. 840 (1933).
13E.g., Klamath Lumber Co. v. Bamber, 74 Ore. 287, 145 Pac. 650 (1915);
Deveny v. Success Co., 228 S.W. 295 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921). The statutes, being
penal in nature, are strictly construed, of course.
24Ft.
STAT. §610.11 (1941), enacted as Fla. Laws 1931, c. 14677, §5. This
same section in FLA. STAT. 1949 contains the important 1949 addition of the words
"or defend."
15104 Fla. 446, 140 So. 320 (1932), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 634 (1932).
CONsT. Decl. of Rights §§1, 4, 12.
2"Gray v. Central Fla. Lumber Co., 104 Fla. 446, 459. 140 So. 320, 326 (1932).
16Ft.
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This statement, of course, settles nothing; it merely restates the constitutional issues raised in the first place. The opinion indicates that the
Court was influenced in its thinking by the more stringent penalties
prescribed in other jurisdictions and by the reinstatement ab initio,
under Florida law, of the suspended privileges upon payment of delinquent taxes.
The Court has never been called upon to consider the effect to be
accorded transactions taking place during the period of suspension.
Texas, in construing a similar provision, 18 takes the position that the
corporation can make valid contracts during suspension, and that
business then transacted is not void;' 9 the only right lost is that of
suing and defending in the Texas courts.2 0 Other jurisdictions go so
22
21
far as to nullify any acts performed, including contracts made,
during suspension. The prevailing view as regards the legal status of
the corporation is summarized in Watts v. Liberty Royalties Corp.:23
"Its powers are only in suspension and reinstatement of its charter
restores it to all of its powers and validates all of its acts, including
the acts done while its charter was suspended."
This position appears analogous to the results of action by an agent
outside the scope of his authority. His act, though done in behalf of
his principal, is not binding upon the latter unless ratified. 24 Reinstatement is in the nature of ratification, since it relates to the date of
suspension, and accordingly the corporation is thereupon regarded as
25
never having been suspended.
In Jarvis v. Chapman Properties,Inc.26 appellee, a Florida corporation, filed its bill to foreclose a mortgage on November 24, 1931. On
the following January 1 it became subject to forfeiture of privileges
by reason of delinquency. On March 14 Jarvis answered, challenging
its right to maintain suit by reason of its delinquency. It paid its fee
and filed its report on March 21; and on August 22 a final decree
favorable to it was entered. Jarvis did not at any time move to dismiss.
18 E.g., TFx. STAT., REV. Crv. art. 7091 (Vernon's 1948).
19 Federal Crude Oil Co. v. Yount-Lee Oil Co., 122 Tex. 21, 52 S.W.2d 56
(1982); see 11 TExAs L. REV. 250 (1932).
20
sbell v. Gulf Union Oil Co., 147 Tex. 6, 209 S.W.2d 762 (1948).
21
Sunset Oil Co. v. Marshall Oil Co., 16 Cal.2d 651, 107 P.2d 393 (1940).
22
1rvine & Meier v. Wienner, 212 Mich. 199, 180 N.W. 492 (1920).
23106 F.2d 941, 944 (10th Cir. 1939).
24
Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co. v. Smith, 130 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. Civ. App.

1939).
2

5Watts v. Liberty Royalties Corp., 106 F.2d 941 (10th Cir. 1939).
26110 Fla. 17, 147 So. 860 (1933).
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By the terms of the statute the corporation was not deprived of the
privilege of maintaining the suit at the time of 'institution thereof, since
it was not then in arrears. The Court held that although the right of
complainant corporation to maintain suit was in suspension from
January 1 to March 21, 1932, the cause was merely dormant during
that period, and that "... when complainant filed its report and
paid its tax the right to continue to maintain the suit was revived . . . .7

The opinion further states that there is ".

.

. no

law or rule of court which required the dismissal of the cause by the
court of its own motion ..." 2 What the result would have been
had a motion to dismiss been filed during the pendency of the suspension was expressly left undecided. Seemingly the answer is the
opposite today in view of two later decisions now to be considered.
Less than a year later the respondent below in Christie v. Highland
Waterfront Co. 29 moved, more than twenty days after final decree in

favor of a Florida corporation, to vacate this decree on the ground
that the corporation had become delinquent during the suit and had
remained so. Before the hearing on this motion the corporation cured
its default, and the motion was denied. The Supreme Court affirmed.
At approximately the same time Diaz v. ParklandEstates30 raised the
problem of dismissal of the suit of a Florida corporation delinquent
not only upon entry of judgment but also at institution of suit. Diaz
failed, to plead the suspension, but on appeal sought reversal of an
adverse judgment on this ground. The opinion, which unfortunately
fails to state the facts dearly, does not indicate whether the court
below was informed of the default before the appeal was taken. In
reversing the judgment appealed from the Court stated:3 1
"...

the terms of the statute are . . . applicable to a corpo-

ratioh in actual default, and it becomes the duty of all the courts
of this State to give effect to the statute by refusing to allow
suits to be maintained in such courts of this State until defaults
under the statute are duly remedied . . . ."
Dismissal must follow whenever the court learns of the default,
..

. despite the fact that until the point is raised on the record,
27Id. at 20, 147 So. at 861.
291b4F.
29114 Fla. 263, 153 So. 784 (1934).
S114 Fla. 273, 154 So. 199 (1934).
311id. at 274, 154 So. at 200.
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the right of a corporation to maintain a suit... will be presumed so
long as the contrary is not made to appear."3 2 Although a judgment
rendered without knowledge of default is voidable, not void, the
defendant need not plead suspension prior to such judgment.
The next case, Irwin v. Gilson Realty Co.,33 was a foreclosure suit
by a New York corporation. It filed its bill on February 21, 1933,
although it was in default at the time; and on April 3 Irwin moved to
dismiss on this ground. On April 26 the trial court denied his motion
and required him to answer, which he did on May 27 after several
extensions of time. On this date the corporation was still in arrears,
but paid its fees a few days later. The Supreme Court held that the
trial court erroneously denied the motion to dismiss, and that subsequent payment of the tax did not cure this error. On rehearing the
corporation challenged the propriety of using a motion to dismiss in
raising this issue. The Court rejected this argument, citing the Diaz
opinion, and further held that the statute imposes a duty on the courts
to recognize and enforce its terms whenever they learn of default
existing at institution of suit and still continuing when the motion to
dismiss is heard. In 1935 the corporation in Burton v. Oliver Farm
Equipment Sales Co.3 4 was delinquent at the time it instituted suit,
but filed its report and paid its fee before entry of a final decree in
its favor. Its right to maintain the suit was upheld on appeal.
Certain conclusions may be drawn from the Jarvis, Christie, Diaz,
Irwin and Burton cases:
1. A motion to dismiss, an answer, or any other means designed to
call the delinquency of the corporation to the attention of the
court may be used to raise the issue; indeed, it can even be first
raised on appeal, according to the Diaz opinion.
2. Contrary to the broad statement in the Jarvis opinion, the court,
when informed of material delinquency of a corporation, is
under a duty to dismiss the suit of such a complainant unless
the default is remedied promptly and before the decision is
rendered.
3. A corporation delinquent when instituting suit is denied the use
of the courts, even though it removes this delinquency after the
hearing on motion to dismiss.
321d. at 275, 154 So. at 200.

33117 Fla. 394, 158 So. 77 (1934).
34121 Fla. 148, 163 So. 468 (1935).
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4. When the delinquency is raised by answer, the corporation can
still proceed by curing it before final decree.
5. A corporation becoming delinquent after instituting suit can
proceed if it cures its default before the hearing on a motion to
dismiss on this ground.
Since the reasoning in all these cases is predicated on the basie aim
of putting pressure on the corporation to file its reports and pay its
taxes,s 5 the crucial time should logically be that either of the hearing
on motion or of the final decree whenever the default is raised by
answer. The practical step, of course, is to raise the issue squarely by
motion to dismiss upon discovery of the existence of default.
The 1931 statute, besides declaring "forfeit" the charter and corporate privileges, provided specifically that a corporation in default
should not be permitted to "maintain" any action in the Florida
courts.8 8

In 1949, however, after the inadvertent3 7 release of an

opinion construing the 1931 act as not contemplating the suspension
of a delinquent corporation's right to defend as distinct from its right
to attack,38 the Florida Legislature amended the penalty provision to
read as follows: 3 9

"Any corporation failing to comply with the provisions of this
law for six months shall not be permitted to maintain or defend
any action in any court of this state until such reports are filed
and all fees due under this chapter paid."
Thus the Legislature eliminated the necessity of any further argument
as to whether "maintain" embraces "defend."
At the same time, it removed from this section the provision for
suspending the corporate and charter privileges. There was good
reason for this deletion, however. Sections 610.10 and 610.11 of
Florida Statutes 1941 were at best confusing, and perhaps in conflict,
3
5See
3
6See
37

note 6 supra.
note 14 supra.
The word "inadvertent" is used because the first opinion, printed in the
Southern Reporter Advance Sheets of Sept. 22, 1949, was withdrawn after rehearing from the bound volume (see the caption Frisz, Inc. v. Sherry, 41 So.2d
viii), and the memorandum affirmance on rehearing of the judgment below is
under the same caption in 42 So.2d 849 (Fla. 1949).
published
38
Frisz, Inc. v. Sherry, supra note 37.
39FLA. STAT. §610.11 (1949).
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as to the length of time required to convert failure of the corporation
to file its report, and to pay its tax, into suspension of its charter and
corporate privileges in Florida; and the 1949 amendment to Section
610.11 now leaves the matter of suspension exclusively within Section
610.10. Accordingly the only major change is the 1949 addition to

Section 610.11 of the words "or defend."
Denial of the right of a delinquent corporation to defend raises the
following questions:
1. Are the procedural due process requisites of both the United
States 40 and Florida 41 Constitutions met when a claim is presented and a default judgment entered without giving the corporation a chance to be heard? Does not this procedure open
the door to spurious claims?
2. Is equal protection afforded in the courts, as guaranteed by both
the United States 42 and Florida 4s Constitutions, if the opponent
of the corporation is permitted to use the courts while the
corporation is denied such use in the same case?
3. How can any court inform the corporation that it cannot be in
court, and in the same breath hold that it is there for purposes
of a default judgment against it?
The following arguments have been used to sustain suspension of
and other penalties as a constitutional exercise of
corporate privileges
44
legislative power:
is therefore
1. A corporation is the creature of the state, 4and
5
subject to regulation and control by the state;
2. Upon paying the required fees and filing its reports, the corporation can regain its lost privileges; and, since it has the choice
as to whether it is to be barred from the courts, the due process
40U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, §.
41
FI. CONST. Decl. of Rights §12.
42U.S. CoNsr. AMEND. XIV, §1.
43
FLA. CONST. Decl. of Rights, §§1, 4.
44
Caveat: The transactions of some foreign corporations fall within Interstate
commerce, to which an enactment like FLA. STAT. §610.11 (1949) cannot apply,
a limitation recognized in Schwartz v. Frango Corporation, 44 So.2d 292 (Fla.

1950).
45Gray v. Central Florida Lumber Co., 104 Fla. 446, 140 So. 320 (1932);
Natchitoches Finance Co. v. Smith, 175 So. 915 (La. App. 1937).
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and equal protection clauses are not violated; 46
3. Third parties do not lose their remedy in any event, inasmuch
as they can either sue the directors of the corporation as trustees
or sue the de facto corporation. 47
Constitutional attack on the 1949 denial of the right to defend, a
denial added by amendment from the floor48 with apparently little or
no consideration of its constitutionality, may well materialize. Denying the corporation access to the courts in maintaining 9 a suit is unquestionably permissible. Designating it a legal nullity and directing
suit against its trustees or a receiver will withstand constitutional
challenge. But the propriety of authorizing anyone so desiring to
bring the corporation itself into court, and at the same time forbidding
it to appear, is highly questionable. Especially is this true when one
can sue the legal representatives of a delinquent corporation, who are
not only permitted but expected to defend its assets against spurious
claims and thereby to secure a decision on the merits. From the standpoint of the state, even a strong desire to collect taxes does not justify
disregard of procedural due process.
JEERy R. HussE

4GBoyle v. Lakeview Creamery Co., 9 Cal.2d 16, 68 P.2d 968 (1937).
cf. 4 U. or FA. L. REV. 96 (1951) re suit
after
dissolution.
48
FLA. H.R.J. 949 (1949).
49As to whether "maintain" includes "institute," contrast Irwin v. Cilson Realty
Co., 117 Fla. 894, 405, 158 So. 77, 82 (1934), inwhich Brown, J., states that
"... institution of a suit is the beginning of its maintenance," with Burton v.
Oliver Farm Equip. Sales Co., 121 Fla. 148, 149, 163 So. 468, 469 (1935). The
logic of the former opinion seems inescapable.
4711 CALw. L. RPv. 40 (1922);

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1951

9

